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Summary. The paper analyses the sources of income measurement error in surveys with a
unique data set. We use the Austrian 2008–2011 waves of the European Union ‘Statistics on
income and living conditions’ survey which provide individual information on wages, pensions
and unemployment benefits from survey interviews and officially linked administrative records.
Thus, we do not have to fall back on complex two-sample matching procedures like related
studies. We empirically investigate four sources of measurement error, namely social desirabil-
ity, sociodemographic characteristics of the respondent, the survey design and the presence
of learning effects. We find strong evidence for a social desirability bias in income reporting,
whereas the presence of learning effects is mixed and depends on the type of income under
consideration. An Owen value decomposition reveals that social desirability is a major expla-
nation of misreporting in wages and pensions, whereas sociodemographic characteristics are
most relevant for mismatches in unemployment benefits.
Keywords: Income measurement error; Register data; Response error; Survey data; Survey
error; Survey methods
1. Introduction
The rapidly increasing availability of survey and administrative microdata has created immense
possibilities for contemporary empirical economics. However, this progress has also raised ques-
tions of data quality and validation to ensure the reliability and accuracy of information. In the
literature, the analysis of differences between responses in traditional surveys and administrative
records has been a fruitful method to assess quality of microdata. Particular attention has been
paid to income data since it is essential for a variety of welfare indicators and policy questions.
Moreover, public interest in questions of income distribution has been growing considerably in
recent years and research on income inequality has rapidly gained momentum. The underlying
income information is usually obtained either from household surveys or from administrative
records whereby both sources of data have their idiosyncratic merits and drawbacks. Although
policy recommendations are frequently based on survey data, the accuracy of survey responses
is often questioned and issues ofmeasurement error are raised. Accordingly, there is still no con-
sensusonwhat is thebestway to collect incomedataat themicrolevel (HansenandKneale, 2013).
Potential differences between survey responses and administrative records have already been
Address for correspondence: Stefan Angel, Department of Socioeconomics, Vienna University of Economics
and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1, Vienna 1020, Austria.
E-mail: Stefan.Angel@wu.ac.at
2 S. Angel, F. Disslbacher, S. Humer and M. Schnetzer
addressed in the literature ondata quality andmeasurement error (Moore et al., 2000;Lohmann,
2011). The identiﬁcation of measurement errors requires by deﬁnition a point of reference to
judge the accuracy of the information. In validation studies, administrative records are fre-
quently used as benchmarks even though this assumption has also been relaxed to a varying
extent in the recent literature (Kapteyn andYpma, 2007; Abowd and Stinson, 2013; Bingley and
Martinello, 2017). The choice of the benchmark data reﬂects the researchers’ conﬁdence in the
accuracy of a speciﬁc data set. We rely on evidence that the quality of Austrian administrative
data is very high (Asamer et al., 2016; Schnetzer et al., 2015; Berka et al., 2012).
This paper focuses on two research questions.What are the reasons formisreporting income in
surveys and do these reasons differ with respect to speciﬁc types of income, i.e. wages, pensions
and unemployment beneﬁts? The causes why survey responses may deviate from administra-
tive records are manifold (Bound et al., 2001; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Kapteyn and Ypma,
2007; Abowd and Stinson, 2013; Paulus, 2015). Speciﬁcally, we focus on four sources of error
emphasized in the literature. These are
(a) the presence of a social desirability bias in survey responses,
(b) speciﬁc sociodemographic characteristics of the respondent,
(c) the survey design and
(d) the presence of learning effects in the response behaviour.
These reasons may also vary with respect to the income component. For instance, social desir-
ability may have different directions for earned income and for unemployment beneﬁts.
The data requirements for an empirical evaluation of these sources of error are extensive.
Most previous studies have been forced to combine survey and register records via statistical
matching techniques, based on either register data or error-prone self-reported identiﬁers, such
as social security numbers. Additionally, the consent of individuals to match survey and register
data is usually needed. Since participation in the matched sample often is voluntary, the sample
is biased towards individuals givingmore accurate responses (Bollinger, 1998). Brieﬂy speaking,
there is evidence of a consent bias for matched sources of data. Furthermore, samples based on
optional matching are often found to be non-representative for the whole population (Jenkins
et al., 2006, 2008; Sakshaug and Eckman, 2012, 2016).
Fortunately, the Austrian 2008–2011 waves of the European Union ‘Statistics on income
and living conditions’ (EU SILC) survey do not suffer from such shortcomings. In this data
set, the survey responses are linked directly to administrative records by the national statistical
institute via unique personal identiﬁers. Compared with probabilistic methods, this procedure
ensures that the administrative income information is linked exactly to the corresponding survey
respondent and thus reduces matching uncertainty drastically. Hence, our data set provides
both survey and register income data for the exact same observational units and offers a unique
opportunity to evaluate the drivers of income measurement error.
We thus can compare survey and administrative data within one data set, which is a consider-
able advantage compared with most existing research. Even the most prominent studies about
income measurement error are based on sophisticated statistical matching procedures of survey
and administrative data sets. Other validation studies are restricted to individuals working at
a single company (Pischke, 1995). The data set that is used in this paper is not subject to any
of these limitations. Furthermore, in contrast with papers studying measurement errors in total
household income,we can analyse different single income components including unemployment
beneﬁts, which has rarely been done yet.
In summary, we contribute to the literature in multiple ways. We exploit a unique data set
providing both administrative records and survey responses to analyse differences in income
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reports. We can conduct a comparative analysis of three different concepts of income with a
panel structure over the period of 4 years. Contrary to other studies that are limited to sin-
gle companies, our analysis is representative of the whole population. Finally, we apply an
Owen value decomposition to assess quantitatively the importance of four speciﬁc reasons for
misreporting.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of
potential sources of measurement errors that have been elaborated in the existing literature. In
Section 3, we discuss the speciﬁcs of our EU SILC data set and provide descriptive statistics
for the structure of errors in our data. We then apply a multinomial logit model to evaluate
the effects of the above-mentioned sources of error (a)–(d) in Section 4. For a more detailed
analysis of sources of error (a) and (d), we conduct panel regressions to detect changes of
response behaviour over time. We conclude our analysis quantifying the relative importance
of the four sources error of on the basis of an Owen value decomposition. Finally, Section 5
provides a summary of our results.
2. Reasons for measurement error in survey income data
Although the use of administrative data in empirical research has rapidly gained momentum
(Einav and Levin, 2014), the accuracy of survey information has increasingly been contested
during recent years (Meyer et al., 2015). Erroneous information can arise from misreporting
by respondents and decrease the overall quality of survey data. Misreporting in surveys is
particularly grave when the affected data are, like income, the basis for policy making.
Following the psychological literature on cognitive processes when answering a survey ques-
tion, misreporting of income can arise from, ﬁrst, troubles that are related to the interpretation
andunderstandingof the question asked, second, problems in retrieving and judging the relevant
information as well as its placement in time and, third, difﬁculties in formulating a response
in the required format (Tourangeau et al., 2010). The theoretical and empirical literature on
income measurement errors emphasizes four main reasons for misreporting:
(a) social desirability,
(b) sociodemographic characteristics of the respondent,
(c) speciﬁcs of the survey design and
(d) the presence of learning effects.
However, the existing literature has ignored that those four reasons for misreporting can vary
with the type of income under consideration.
For instance, Angel et al. (2018) analysed reporting errors for total disposable household
income in Austria, which is not observed directly but aggregated ex post on the basis of a
comprehensive inquiry of single income components. Misreporting based on total household
income thus disregards potential heterogeneity of the error-generating process between house-
hold members and income components. Further, misreporting of income can go into two direc-
tions: respondents can overreport or underreport a particular type of income. In what follows,
we discuss how reasons (a)–(d) can result in overreporting or underreporting of wages and, then,
why reasons (a)–(d) might lead to different expectations for the misreporting of pensions and
unemployment beneﬁts, which are the two other income components that are considered in this
paper.
First, social desirability bias is probably the most important reason for income misreporting
in surveys. Because of the sensitivity of questions about income, social desirability might lead
to deliberate misreporting (Moore et al., 2000). It is widely documented that sensitive questions
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elicit patterns of overreporting and underreporting for socially desirable and socially undesirable
behaviour, attitudes and characteristics respectively (Bound et al., 2001).Forwages, the resulting
hypothesis is that reported values are biased towards the mean; hence reporting errors are
expected to be mean reverting. Respondents at the lower tail of the wage distribution overreport
as they feel ashamed of their actual economic conditions, whereas respondents at the upper
tail of the distribution underreport since they do not want to disclose their high wages to an
(unknown) interviewer. Such a reporting pattern is consistent with a desire for social comfort
in the sense that households tend to locate themselves in the middle of the distribution. Related
microlevel validation studies typically conﬁrm themean reverting nature of the error in reported
earnings (Kreiner et al., 2015; Kim and Tamborini, 2014; Pischke, 1995; Bound et al., 1994;
BoundandKrueger, 1991).As an exception,Hariri andLassen (2017) found for theNetherlands
that respondents at the top of the income distribution overreport their income. In their study,
however, income comprises earnings, employers’ pension contributions, transfer and capital
income,whichwere collected exclusively via telephone interviewswithaone-shot recall question.
These results are thus not easily comparable with most other studies that focus on earnings and
derive income data from surveys with more complex interview modes.
Second, misreporting of income might vary with sociodemographic characteristics of the
respondent (Kreiner et al., 2015; Kim and Tamborini, 2014; Bound et al., 2001; Tamborini
and Kim, 2013). We expect to ﬁnd a higher propensity to overreport wages for males, due to a
desire to demonstrate social status and to comply with the male breadwinner model. Existing
research suggests different misreporting patterns by sex, where males are found to overreport
earningsmore often than females (Bound andKrueger, 1991; Bollinger, 1998;Micklewright and
Schnepf, 2010; Pedace and Bates, 2000; Kim and Tamborini, 2014). Kim and Tamborini (2014)
and Bound et al. (1994) found that higher educated workers report earnings more correctly.
Respondents with higher education might display lower rates of misreporting as this group is
potentially more likely to be familiar with the purpose and relevance of households surveys. The
positive correlation between education and ﬁnancial literacy that is documented in the literature
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014) may also explain some of these ﬁndings.
The relationship between misreporting and age is a priori unclear. On the one hand, cognitive
abilities to answer the questionnaire decrease with age. On the other hand, older respondents
receive wages for a longer period of time and are in more stable employment. Since the vast
majority of validation studies has found a negative relationship between misreporting and age,
we adopt these ﬁndings for the expectations for ourAustrian sample (Kim andTamborini, 2012,
2014; Bound and Krueger, 1991). Two additional sociodemographic characteristics potentially
contributing to the accuracy of responses are the number of changes in the employment status
during the income reference period, which is related to receiving income from different sources
and, second, the number of months spent in a speciﬁc employment status during the reference
period. Changes in employment status can be associated with telescoping errors, which refer
to misplacing the receipt of a particular source of income in time. A stable employment status
is associated with less variation in the level of income received. With respect to wages, it is
reasonable toassume that changes in employment status increase reporting errorswhereas longer
periods of employment lead to lessmisreporting, since it is easier to recall the remuneration.Kim
and Tamborini (2014) found that occupation or industry switchers are more prone to misreport
earnings whereas Bound et al. (1994) documented a negative relationship between job tenure
(years with current employer) and response error.
What the literature has largely ignored is the relationshipbetweenmisreporting andhealth, the
degree of urbanization and the country of birth. Healthier individuals may give more accurate
answers because they are in better mental conditions and therefore are less likely to make
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recall or response errors. Further, we expect to ﬁnd less misreporting, the higher the degree of
urbanization at the respondent’s place of residence is. The rationale of this argument is rooted
in the anonymity of cities, whereas, in rural areas, mistrust in unknown interviewers might be
more pronounced. Additionally, misreporting is related to the respondent’s country of birth.
Being foreign born can serve as an indicator of language skills and familiarity with institutional
settings. As both factors are relevant for the comprehension of the questions and the correct
allocation of total income across income types, we expect to ﬁnd more misreporting of wages
for foreign-born respondents.
Third, and regarding the survey design and setting, a wide range of variables is likely to inﬂu-
ence response behaviour.We focus on the role of the interviewmode (Lynn et al., 2012), the time
span between the income reference period and the interview, and proxy responses. Regarding
the interview mode, telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI))
are considered to be more susceptible to misreporting of wages than a face-to-face setting
(computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI)). Fessler et al. (2017) found that households
that are interviewed via telephone report higher incomes on average than those interviewed
personally. Furthermore, it is crucial whether the respondent provides the required income
information personally or via an entitled third party. Whereas some studies have found little
proxy bias (Bound and Krueger, 1991; Mellow and Sider, 1983), others suggest a downward
bias (Tamborini and Kim, 2013; Reynolds and Wenger, 2012). We expect more misreporting of
wages for proxy responses, resulting from a lack of information. Finally, we hypothesize that,
the larger the time span between the interview and the income reference period, the larger the
error in reported wages because of recall and memory problems.
The fourth, and last, central issue with reporting errors is the presence of learning effects. If
present, reporting errors are supposed to attenuate with cumulated survey experience. Learning
effects are related to recall and retrieval strategies of respondents and are best explained in the
context of panel surveys, where the same households are interviewed repeatedly. In the ﬁrst wave
of participation, respondents are unexperienced regarding the survey setting and unprepared
to answer the questionnaire. In the follow-up waves, however, respondents might be equipped
with income tax documents and other relevant ﬁles. Therefore, we expect to ﬁnd misreporting
of wages to decrease with accumulated survey experience. Likewise, a learning effect can also
be expected for pensions and unemployment beneﬁts.
Whereas some variables might have similar effects on wages, pensions and unemployment
beneﬁts, we expect diverging effects for others. For instance, wages (and pensions) are attached
to the labour market and tied to (past) individual effort, whereas unemployment beneﬁts are
often stigmatized as charity despite actually being an insurance. The socially desirable behaviour
is thus to downplay the level received leading to a general underreporting of unemployment
beneﬁts. Regarding the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondent, we expect males
to underreport unemployment beneﬁts more often and stronger than females since receiving
beneﬁts contrasts the common male breadwinner model. Being unemployed might be asso-
ciated with a higher social stigma for the better educated. Therefore, we expect underreport-
ing or overreporting of unemployment beneﬁts to be respectively an increasing or decreasing
function of education. Although being foreign born might lead to a higher misreporting of
wages and pension income, we expect to ﬁnd less overreporting of unemployment beneﬁts since
those who are born abroad might be particularly prone to downplay the level of received state
transfers.
With respect to the number of changes in employment status, some particularities must be
mentioned. Typically, respondents retire only once and thus might be better informed about the
level of pension that theywill receive. Precisely for this reason, we expect to ﬁnd lessmisreporting
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Table 1. Expected effects of misreporting by income types†
Expectations for Expectations for Expectations for
wages pensions unemployment
beneﬁts
S<A S>A S<A S>A
S<A S>A
(a) Social desirability
Income decile (increasing) + − + − + −
(b) Sociodemographic characteristics
Gender (reference: female) − + − + + −
Education (reference: compulsory school) − − − − − −
Age (increasing) − − − − − −
Country of birth (reference: Austria) + + + + + −
Health status (reference: very bad) − − − − + +
Degree of urbanization (reference: <10000
inhabitants)
− − − − − −
Changes in employment status (reference:
none)
+ + − − + +
Months in corresponding employment status + + + + ∼ ∼
(reference: 12 months)
(c) Survey setting
Mode of interview (reference: CAPI ) + + + + + +
Type of interview (reference: personal) + + + + + +
Month of interview (reference: March–May) + + + + + +
(d) Learning effect
Wave of interview (reference: ﬁrst) − − − − − −
†The table summarizes our expectations about the likelihood to overreport and underreport income conditionally
on different sources of errors. S < A, underreporting in the survey; S > A, overreporting in the survey; +, an
increasing probability of falling in that speciﬁc reporting category; −, decreasing probability; ∼, an ambiguous
relationship.
of pensions, if the employment status for those receiving pension income has changed in the
reference period. The relationship between the number of months spent in unemployment and
misreporting of unemployment beneﬁts is ambiguous. Short spells of unemployment might be
associatedwith lessmisreporting since respondents are better informed about the actual transfer
due to the singularity of the situation. However, respondents might care less about the level of
received unemployment beneﬁts, the shorter the time that is spent in unemployment.
Table 1 summarizes our expectations regarding the direction of the effect of the relevant
variables that are related to social desirability, sociodemographic characteristics, the survey
setting and the learning effect, for overreporting and underreporting wages, pension income
and unemployment beneﬁts.
3. Data, variables and method
3.1. Data and variables
For the assessment of income measurement errors in surveys, we make use of the Austrian
EU SILC survey, which is a rotational household panel with a quarter of respondents being
exchanged each year. The sample is drawn from all private households with a main residence
in Austria according to the central population register. The main questionnaire is aimed at
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household members aged 16 years or older and is conducted partly with CAPI and partly with
CATI. In certain cases, proxy interviewswith other householdmemberswere carried out instead
of personal interviews (e.g. roughly 11% in 2011).
The primary motivation to utilize Austrian EU SILC data is a unique feature compared with
other household surveys: for four consecutive years, it provides combined income information
from personal interviews and administrative sources. Up to the year 2011, incomes on both
personal and household levels were obtained via conventional survey interrogation. From 2012
on, income data gathered from administrative records have replaced survey data for certain
components of disposable household income, like wages, pensions and unemployment beneﬁts.
Fortunately, Statistics Austria could merge administrative income data with the full EU SILC
survey sample from 2011 back to 2008. The detailed merging process of register and survey data
is described further below.
The rotational character of the EU SILC panel enables us to track households for as long
as four consecutive years. With the data at hand, this maximum period of observation applies
to the survey cohort that ﬁrst participated in 2008 and remained in the survey until 2011. The
2007 and 2009 cohorts are each covered in three waves, and the 2006 and 2010 cohorts in two
waves. In contrast with Eurostat’s EU SILC user database, the Austrian national SILC data
set provided by Statistics Austria delivers cross-sectional and longitudinal information in one
single database. In this integrated data set, there are one cross-sectional and three longitudinal
weights for those households in the rotational sample that have already been interviewed repeat-
edly. By virtue of permanent household and individual identiﬁers, we can track the changes in
household responses compared with changes in the administrative records over time. It should
be noted in this respect that, in contrast with the ﬁrst-time interrogation, follow-up interviews
were predominantly accomplished via telephone (CATI).
Survey income data are collected retrospectively in the EU SILC panel and correspond to the
calendar year before the interview. For income components with unequal net and gross values,
respondents were asked to report either one or both values. When refusing to deliver a precise
ﬁgure, interviewees could also report an income bandwidth. In that case, the speciﬁc income is
estimated on the basis of the empirical distribution of the corresponding income component.
In the event of item non-response for single income categories, missing values are derived partly
from socio-economic characteristics like sex, education and age in an econometric exercise,
and partly from statutory regulations like collective wage agreements. Although the amount of
imputations is generally rather low in the EU SILC data, the application of such estimation
methods may be an important source of measurement error. For instance, roughly 0.5% of the
records had to be completely imputed in 2011 (Statistics Austria, 2014a). Since we focus on
error-generating processes in personal survey responses, we exclude imputed values from the
analysis. We thus restrict our study on net income from wages, pensions and unemployment
beneﬁts for which both survey responses and administrative data are available in the EU SILC
panel. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the number of observations, the interview mode
and the share of imputations for the selected income types.
Register information for the types of income that is used in our study is obtained from various
administrative sources whereof themost important are theAustrian social security database, the
wage tax register and the transfers data set by Public Employment Service Austria. We brieﬂy
describe these data sets below whereas a detailed documentation of administrative sources that
are used in the EU SILC panel is presented in the on-line data appendix A and in Statistics
Austria (2014b). The Austrian social security database provides the social security status, e.g.
whether individuals are employees, pensioners or eligible for unemployment beneﬁts. The wage
tax register contains information on all taxable earnings of employees and pensioners. This
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Table 2. Observations, interview mode and share of imputations—SILC 2008–2011†
Year Number of Share of Imputation share Imputation share Imputation share
observations interview for wages (%) for pensions (%) for unemployment
mode (%) beneﬁts (%)
Households Persons Survey Administrative Survey Administrative
CAPI CATI Survey Administrative
2008 5707 10946 70.0 30.0 4.6 2.6 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.8
2009 5878 11056 57.1 42.9 5.9 1.9 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.8
2010 6188 11493 59.6 40.4 4.8 2.4 1.5 0.4 0.3 0.9
2011 6187 11475 57.3 42.7 3.4 2.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.1
†The six rightmost columns show the share of imputed values for selected income types. Source, SILC 2008–2011;
own calculations.
data set includes wages, public pensions (retirement beneﬁts), paid maternity leave and sickness
beneﬁts.The transfers data set contains thebeginning and endingdate of spells of unemployment
and the respective beneﬁts on a daily basis.
InAustria, employersmust reportwages directly to the tax authorities, retain payroll taxes and
social security contributions, and transfer the residual net income to the employees. Since this is
a standardized electronic procedure and there are regular tax inspections, the quality of the data
is signiﬁcantly higher than of self-reported income tax returns. Concerning ﬂaws in administra-
tive data due to tax avoidance, there is empirical evidence that this is comparatively less of an
issue in Austria than in other countries (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Hassan and Schneider, 2016).
Information on pensions and unemployment beneﬁts is provided straight by public authorities
and correspond to actual payments to the entitled individuals. The probability of measurement
errors in this data set is very low since reports are effectively linked to payments that are also
administrated by the data holders. All in all, recently carried out quality reports onAustrian reg-
ister data certify high conﬁdence in its reliability (Asamer et al., 2016; Statistics Austria, 2014b).
The merging process between survey and administrative data is accomplished reliably with
a branch-speciﬁc personal identiﬁcation number (PIN) for ofﬁcial statistics which serves as
a unique identiﬁer in both sources of data. These 172-digit PINs were introduced to protect
privacy in the communication between public authorities. The PINs are created by the Austrian
Data Protection Commission and are used to identify individuals in the EU SILC survey and
in the administrative sources. Unlike previous studies, we thus do not have to fall back on two-
sample matching processes or the like, since survey responses and retrospective administrative
information are already combined for the years 2008–2011. Studies on measurement errors
usually also depend on consent to link survey responses to administrative records, which often
leads to small sample sizes (Kreuter et al., 2010). In our study, between 95.6% (2008) and 99.4%
(2011) of the respondents in the EU SILC survey could be identiﬁed with a PIN to assign the
register information (Statistics Austria, 2014b). The residual population in the EU SILC survey
couldnotbe found in theadministrative sources and thusnoPINwasavailable.These individuals
are mainly younger than 40 years old, non-Austrian citizens and not registered at their main
residence. Another major advantage of the accurate linkage is that the income reference periods
for the survey and the administrative records overlap exactly and no adjustments to ensure
comparability between the sources of data had to be made.
Reporting income is a two-stage process in the EUSILC survey. At the ﬁrst stage, respondents
must indicate whether a certain income component was received during the reference period.
Only in a second step must the amount of income received from a particular source be reported.
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Table 3. Reporting of income types—SILC 2008–2011†
Year Results for wages (%) Results for pensions (%) Results for unemployment
beneﬁts (%)
Survey Administrative Difference Survey Administrative Difference
Survey Administrative Difference
2008 53.8 56.6 −2:8 24.9 24.1 0.8 7.1 10.2 −3:1
2009 54.8 58.0 −3:2 25.0 24.7 0.4 7.4 10.2 −2:8
2010 55.4 57.9 −2:4 25.9 25.3 0.6 9.1 12.6 −3:5
2011 55.8 59.0 −3:2 24.0 24.6 −0:6 9.2 12.7 −3:5
†The table shows the share of respondents reporting a speciﬁc type of income. Source, SILC 2008–2011; own
calculations.
Consequently, a mismatch between survey and register data can result at either stage. Table 3
shows the percentage of respondents reporting the three income types involved. Wages are
consistently underreported in the survey data by 2.4–3.2 percentage points. By contrast, the
number of individuals reporting pension income is slightly higher in the survey data compared
with the administrative records with the exception of 2011. The share of survey respondents
with declared unemployment beneﬁts is generally lower than indicated by the ofﬁcial statistics.
The deviations range between 2.8 and 3.5 percentage points. Overall, we note a prevailing
underreporting of receipt of income in survey responses with the exception of old age beneﬁts
from 2008 to 2010.
With regard to the level of reported income, we distinguish the following possible cases of
mismatch. Respondents can report a particular source of income in the survey even though it
was not received according to register data (S ×0) or, vice versa, not report a particular type of
income even though it was received according to register data (0×A). Further, the survey report
can positively or negatively deviate from the register data, which corresponds to overreporting
(S>A) and underreporting (S<A) respectively. No mismatch occurs if a respondent reports
the amount that corresponds to the register entry within a narrow range of ±5% (S =A) or if
a speciﬁc type of income was not received according to both survey and register data (0×0).
Since reporting an amount in the survey that corresponds exactly to the register value is almost
impossible, we allow the survey report to deviate marginally from the register entry to fulﬁl
our operational deﬁnition of correct answers. We deﬁne a categorical variable Pr.Yi,k = j/ for
mismatch types j, individuals i=1, : : : ,N and income component k∈ [1, 3] as
Pr.Yi,k = j/=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Pr.Yi,k =0×0/ if no income in the survey and administrative data,
Pr.Yi,k =0×A/ if only administrative record income report
(false negative),
Pr.Yi,k =S<A/ if a survey underreporter,
Pr.Yi,k =S =A/ if the survey value corresponds to the
administrative value,
Pr.Yi,k =S>A/ if a survey overreporter,
Pr.Yi,k =S ×0/ if only survey income report (false positive):
Table 4 gives an overview of the structure of mismatch in Austrian EU SILC data from 2008
to 2011. In this summary, we display the shares of observations in the respective reporting cate-
gories and the median of the absolute and relative deviation between survey and administrative
responses. For all types of income, the shares of overreporters and underreporters are very stable
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Measurement Error in Survey Income Data 11
over the years. There are roughly 17% overreporters and 23% underreporters for wages, which
is a high number compared with only 11–13% of respondents with matching values (apart
from the 40% with no wage income in both sources of data). The median relative deviation
from the administrative information lies around −17% for underreporters and roughly 26% for
overreporters.
Concerning pensions, we see stable shares of reporting types except for 2011 where the per-
centage of correct responses takes a sudden jump to roughly 20%. Between 2008 and 2010, the
share of underreporters exceeds the number of overreporters; however, the median deviation is
considerably higher for the latter group. With regard to unemployment beneﬁts, the share of
correct survey answers is very low and consistently smaller than the shares of overreporters and
underreporters. The median respondents with lower survey than administrative values report
approximately 30% less income. The median relative deviation for overreporters ranges between
34% and 48%.
As we have shown that differences between administrative records and survey responses are
relevant for various income components, we aim to ascribe the occurring mismatches to the
above-mentioned reasons for misreporting. Thus, we are interested in the effect of
(a) social desirability,
(b) sociodemographic characteristics,
(c) aspects of the survey design and
(d) learning effects
on the presence, direction and extent of misreporting of three components of total disposable
household income (wages, pensions and unemployment beneﬁts).
In the empirical analysis, we use different approaches to shed light on these issues. When
studying reasons (a)–(d) for the direction of misreporting, we distinguish between those with
practically correct information, overreporters and underreporters, and consider both the posi-
tive and the negative mismatch. In contrast, when analysing the effect of these reasons on the
extent of misreporting, we focus on the metric difference (survey minus register).
The right-hand side in our econometric speciﬁcation comprises the variables describing rea-
sons (a)–(d) for misreporting. The presence of (a) social desirability bias is indicated by the
respondent’s position in the respective income distribution speciﬁed by the income decile in
the register data. The explanatory variables referring to (b) the sociodemographic character-
istics of the respondent are gender, educational attainment according to the ‘International
standard classiﬁcation of education’, age and a categorical variable referring to health status.
We also include the country of birth, the degree of urbanization at the place of residence and
the employment status with the following options: full-time employed, part-time employed,
full-time entrepreneur, part-time entrepreneur, unemployed, retired, domestic worker, student
or other. Additionally, dummy variables indicating the number of changes in employment
status during the income reference period should capture the stability of employment. Finally,
depending on the type of income that is investigated, we include the number of months being
either full- or part-time employed, retired or unemployed. The distribution of overreporters and
underreporters across the sociodemographic characteristics is shown in Table B.1 in the on-line
supporting information.
The explanatory variables related to (c) the survey setting comprise a dummy variable for the
interviewmode (CAPI or CATI), a dummy variable related to the reporting status (proxy versus
self-reported income) and a categorical variable specifying the month of the interview (March–
May, June–August or September–November). The motivation for this variable is straightfor-
ward: the earlier the interview took place, the shorter is the time span between the income
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reference period and the income reporting. The distribution of the response categories across
the survey setting variables is given in the lower part of Table B.1. The indicator for (d) the
learning effect is a dummy variable for the interview wave ranging from 1 to 4. Individuals
participating in more than one wave are a priori expected to have more experience with income
surveys and tend to provide more reliable responses.
3.2. Method
Our empirical strategy is a three-step procedure. First, we apply a multinomial logit regression
to assess the effect of the single reasons on the direction of mismatch and thus the probability
to overreport or underreport income. Second, we enrich the analysis with panel regressions
to estimate the effect of the single reasons on the extent of misreporting while controlling for
unobserved individual characteristics. Third,wedetermine the relative importanceof the sources
of error for misreporting with an Owen decomposition. In what follows, we describe each of the
three steps brieﬂy.
3.2.1. Multinomial logit
With a multinomial logit model, we search for factors that help us to understand better why
self-reported incomes are above or below their corresponding administrative record values. Our
dependent variable is the mismatch category Pr.Yi,k = j/ and we calculate the probabilities for
reporting less (S<A), the same (S =A) or more (S>A) than his or her true income. Although,
strictly speaking, respondents who do not report income in both sources (0×0) have no mis-
match, this group of observations is not of interest for our main research questions and has
therefore been discarded from the analysis. Additionally, because of the very low number of
observations without income information either in the survey (0×A) or in the administrative
register (S × 0), we restrict our attention to overreporters, underreporters and the consistent
group. We provide estimates for linear probability models in Table C.1 in the on-line appendix.
For each type of income, three linear probability models were estimated: one for those reporting
less (S<A), one for those reporting the same (S=A) and one for those reporting more (S>A)
income in the survey. In each model the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether a certain mismatch type is observed.
By estimating a multinomial logit model via maximum likelihood, we explicitly allow the
estimated coefﬁcients to vary across the mismatch categories. Thereby, we can identify the
determinantsofmismatch separately foroverreporters andunderreporters.This is a considerable
advantage compared with ordinary least square (OLS) regression, since it may be very difﬁcult
to defend the assumption that the variables inﬂuencing underreporting are similarly affecting
the probability of overreporting. Even more, in the standard OLS framework all reporting
errors are pooled together. Consequently, assuming parameter homogeneity across mismatch
categories could not only lead tomisleading interpretations, but also positive and negative errors
could potentially cancel out and leave us with statistically insigniﬁcant estimates. In contrast,
the effect of for example gender or education on the probability of misreporting is allowed to
differ between overreporters and underreporters in the multinomial logit model. This ﬂexibility
enables us to draw a more detailed picture of the factors that inﬂuence the response behaviour
of individuals in income surveys.
3.2.2. Panel regression
Although we consider an extensive and diverse set of control variables, we cannot rule out
that our estimate lacks relevant but unobservable determinants. To check the robustness of our
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ﬁndings, we thus make use of the longitudinal dimension of the EU SILC panel from 2008
to 2011 and employ ﬁxed effect estimates. The dependent variable is the difference between
the survey and administrative records for each person-year. The focus on within-individual
changes makes it possible to control for individual characteristics that are unobserved but
supposedly constant over time, such as the cognitive ability to answer interviews or past expe-
rience with surveys. To purge these unobservable characteristics in two related speciﬁcations,
we apply panel OLS regression models with individual and time ﬁxed effects. In Table B.9
in the on-line supplementary materials we report the number and the proportion of observa-
tions in our unbalanced panel sample that jumped over a given number of income deciles. For
wages we ﬁnd that 3.348 individuals (37.9%) experienced a change of at least one decile, in
the case of old age beneﬁts 1.174 people (25.2%) and in the case of unemployment beneﬁts
491 (76.8%) units changed at least one decile across the years. We conclude that the observed
variation is sufﬁcient to identify the corresponding coefﬁcients. We prefer a linear OLS spec-
iﬁcation as this provides a clear interpretation of marginal effects on the original scale. In
contrast, for longitudinal (non-linear) binary and multinomial logit response models with ﬁxed
effects, the intuitive interpretation of estimates as predicted probabilities (or various types of
marginal effects) is not a viable option because the unobserved heterogeneity vector of per-
son ﬁxed effects is not estimated (see for example Pforr (2014) for a more detailed discus-
sion).
In the ﬁrst panel speciﬁcation, our primary interest is the inﬂuence of social desirability on
the difference between the survey report and the administrative value. We expect a clear pat-
tern across income deciles, with a positive mismatch (i.e. overreporting) in the lower parts of
the distribution and a growing negative mismatch (i.e. underreporting) as we approach the top
income earners. In the second panel speciﬁcation, we are particularly interested in the learning
effect where only the absolute mismatch is relevant. The question is whether individuals partic-
ipating in multiple survey waves tend to decrease reporting errors and repeated interrogations
are associated with a statistically signiﬁcant learning effect over time. The set of explanatory
variables resembles the multinomial models apart from gender and the educational level, which
both show negligible within-variation between adults.
3.2.3. Owen value decomposition
Finally, we are interested in the relative importance of error sources (a)–(d) and apply an Owen
value decomposition of the explained variance (R2) in a pooled cross-sectional regression. This
procedure enables us to estimate the marginal contribution of each group of explanatory vari-
ables to the total R2. The Owen value decomposition is a generalization of the Shapley value
decomposition and is suitable to assert the relative importance of groups of regressors for ex-
plaining the variance of the dependent variable (Huettner and Sunder, 2012). To the best of our
knowledge, such an assessment has not yet been done in the literature on income measurement
error. To assess both time varying and time constant explanatory variables, the decomposition
is based on pooled cross-sectional models for all four years with the difference between survey
and register data as the dependent variable.
4. Results
Before turning to the results of the econometric exercise, we study the unconditional existence
of a social desirability bias and a learning effect in the data.
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Measurement Error in Survey Income Data 15
Fig. 1 shows the average relative difference between the survey response and the register
entry per percentile of the distribution of wages, pensions and unemployment beneﬁts. Overall,
the typical pattern of a mean reverting error is visible. Thus, respondents in lower income
percentiles of a speciﬁc type of income report values that are higher than their register record
values and vice versa for respondents at the upper part of the distribution. Fig. 1 is cut off
between a relative mismatch of +50% and −25%. The pattern is most distinctive for wages and
least pronounced for unemployment beneﬁts, but in general corresponds to the expected social
desirability behaviour.
Fig. 2 illustrates the learning effect over the four survey waves. The covers depict the absolute
logarithmic difference between the two sources of data in the mean, the median, the 25th and
the 75th percentile. For wages, we ﬁnd a slight reduction in the differences for all observed
income quantiles after the ﬁrst wave. A small reduction in error over time is also present in
the 25th quantile and the median of unemployment beneﬁts. In contrast, for pension income,
the error does not seem to decrease over time. Thus, the data display no or, if anything, a very
small learning effect. Fig. B.1 in the on-line appendix replicates Fig. 2, however, using only
observations that remained in the panel in all four waves, i.e. from 2008 to 2011. With this
sample the outcome for pensions and unemployment beneﬁts resembles that of the unbalanced
sample. For wages, the learning effect almost disappears.
In what follows, we shall test whether the observed patterns of mean reverting errors and
the learning effect remain valid in a multivariate model. Given that we control for a variety of
variables capturing the complexity of the annual income stream (e.g. changes in employment
status), a signiﬁcant effect ofmean reverting errorswould emphasize the role of social desirability
as an important source of error.
4.1. Likelihood of reporting more or less
4.1.1. Social desirability
For ease of interpretation, Table 5 displays average marginal effects that are derived from
the multinomial logit models. For all three types of personal income, the estimates for the
corresponding income deciles—with the ﬁfth decile as reference category—conﬁrm the mean
reverting error.Thus, comparedwith themiddleof thewagedistribution, the likelihoodofunder-
reporting is signiﬁcantly lower in the bottom deciles and signiﬁcantly higher in the top deciles.
Vice versa, the probability of overreporting increases by up to 51 percentage points in the ﬁrst
decile and is signiﬁcantly lower in higher deciles.
For pensions, this pattern is very similar although less pronounced since the average marginal
effects of income deciles on both underreporting and particularly overreporting are smaller.
Finally, recipients of unemployment beneﬁts are no exception from the general pattern. Higher
unemployment beneﬁts correspond to a higher likelihood of underreporting and a lower likeli-
hood of overreporting. Effects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for almost all deciles.
If we look at the probability of roughly similar levels of income in both sources (S =A), lower
income groups tend to report correct wages less often than do middle income groups. To a
smaller extent, this also applies to the highest deciles. For pensions, changes in the probability
of S =A aremore symmetrically spread around themiddle whereas, for unemployment beneﬁts,
income deciles generally do not have strong statistically signiﬁcant effects.
Summing up, we interpret these results as evidence of an income mean reverting type of
social desirability. The estimates also reveal that the mean reverting pattern does not
exclusively apply to wages but seems to be present also for non-market income and transfer
payments.
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4.1.2. Sociodemographic characteristics
Males have a signiﬁcantly higher or lower tendency of respectively overreporting or under-
reporting all three types of income.Overall, the gender-speciﬁc effect is largest forwages.Related
to that, men display a slightly lower propensity to report matching values for wages. These re-
sults could reﬂect some underlying male breadwinner or masculinity normwhich ceteris paribus
renders men to overreport market income more often. On the basis of this argument, we also
expected men rather to conceal receipt of non-market transfers. However, our estimates for
unemployment beneﬁts do not provide support for this hypothesis. Concerning education, we
ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between respondents with higher educational attainments compared
with compulsory education for wages and pensions. Underreporting decreases whereas overre-
porting increases with the educational level. For the point estimates it also does not make much
difference whether respondents hold a post-secondary or a tertiary degree. Contrary to what we
have expected for unemployment beneﬁts, there is no evidence that underreporting is an increas-
ing function of education. All education dummies are statistically insigniﬁcant in this model. In
line with the results for social desirability (income quantiles) and gender, it seems that there is no
big social stigma related to levels of unemployment transfers (assuming that the other control
variables capture cognitive errors sufﬁciently). Instead, it is possible that these transfers are gen-
erally regarded as legally acquired insurance payments. Only age exerts a statistically signiﬁcant,
albeit very small, negative effect on the likelihood of underreporting unemployment beneﬁts.
Being born in a central and eastern European country (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the CzechRepublic,
Estonia,Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,Malta, Poland,Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) does not
make a signiﬁcant difference for the likelihood of misreporting wages compared with Austria,
whereas we ﬁnd a higher probability of underreporting wages for the Yugosphere (Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia andMontenegro, andMacedonia), Turkey and other countries of
birth (and a corresponding lower propensity to report matching wages). For the remaining two
income components, the country of birth is less relevant with two exceptions: being born in the
EU 15 countries signiﬁcantly raises the likelihood of overreporting pensions by 11 percentage
points. Furthermore, natives from the Yugosphere bear a higher probability of underreporting
unemployment beneﬁts. Summing up, the evidence hints at remaining problems of correctly
understanding the data collection process by non-natives but this is primarily an issue for the
underreporting of wages.
Health problems are expected to hinder income reporting. The strongest evidence for a de-
creasing probability of misreporting with improved health is found for pensions. Related to that,
respondents tend to provide correct pension incomes the healthier they are. Better health also
reduces the likelihood of underreporting wages but this is only signiﬁcant when we compare
those in very good health with those with very bad health. However, this pattern is completely
reversed for overreporting wages. Moreover, there is no evidence for a relationship between
health and the misreporting of unemployment beneﬁts.
For all three types of income, underreporting is less prevalent, if the respondent’s place of
residence is in a highly urbanized region. In the case of overreporting, this relationship is insignif-
icant for pensions and inverted for wages and unemployment beneﬁts. As we expected any kind
of misreporting to be reduced with rising degree of urbanization, this result could for example
be due to differences in types of jobs and the associated wage structures in urbanized regions.
As an indicator for income stability, we include variables capturing the number of changes in
status and the number of months spent in a speciﬁc employment status. As expected, Table 5
exhibits that changes in status correspond to higher probabilities of misreporting and to lower
chances of reporting correct incomes. In general, the effects show signiﬁcantly higher probabili-
ties for underreporting, particularly for pensions and unemployment beneﬁts. Furthermore, we
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ﬁnd that overreporting unemployment beneﬁts is 41% percentage points more likely if the spell
was shorter than 6months and 16% points more likely if the spell lasted between 6 and 8months
during the income reference period. An explanation for this ﬁnding could be that particularly
short spells of unemployment are associated with recall and telescoping errors. There are no
signiﬁcant average marginal effects of the number of months on the probability of a match be-
tween the two sources of data. Overreporting unemployment beneﬁts is 44% percentage points
less likely for short-term recipients than for long-term recipients. This general pattern is similar
for underreported wages but almost non-existent for pension incomes.
4.1.3. Survey setting
Against what we have expected, average marginal effects of telephone interviews (CATI) on
both types of misreporting are generally negative; however, they are statistically not signiﬁcant.
For wages, responses from CATI are 3 percentage points more likely to match administrative
records than from CAPI. Proxy interviews increase the probability of underreporting wages
and pensions. For wages, there is also a marginally negative effect on overreporting. Proxy
interviews have an effect neither on overreporting of pensions nor on any type of misreporting
of unemployment beneﬁts. Moreover, having the same interviewer as in the previous year does
not have a major effect on misreporting. Only unemployment beneﬁts are slightly less likely to
be underreported.
Looking at the month of the interview, we ﬁnd that reporting errors for wages are more likely
the later in the year the interview is conducted, i.e. the larger the time span between the income
reference period and the interview. For pensions, however, this applies only to more distant
interview months (more than 8 months) and is only statistically signiﬁcant for underreporting.
For unemployment beneﬁts, there is no signiﬁcant relationship at all. Finally, the interview year
generally does not play any signiﬁcant role. The large and signiﬁcant time effects for pensions
in 2011 partly appear by design because, (only) for this year, Statistics Austria already derived
a great share of pension incomes from registers before they backcalculated the Austrian SILC.
4.1.4. Learning effect
Asalready indicatedby thedescriptive illustration inFig. 2, themultinomial logitmodel basedon
pooled cross-sections does not yield strong evidence for learning effects. In fact, we ﬁnd slightly
lower probabilities of providing correct answers for pensions and unemployment beneﬁts for
respondents in advanced survey waves. In the next step, we shall apply panel regressions, which
additionally purge unobservable individual ﬁxed effects, for this question and test whether this
preliminary result holds.
To sum up the results of the logit models, the average marginal effects suggest that the income
level and sociodemographic characteristics are far more relevant than the interview context for
explaining reporting errors. Relative importance, however, will be investigated more system-
atically further below. Moreover, the general patterns that were found for social desirability
(income quantiles) and for gender, age and education among the sociodemographic factors are
quite similar for all three types of income. Concerning the survey setting, effects for wages and
pensions are close, whereas unemployment beneﬁts are hardly inﬂuenced by this set of variables.
4.2. Extent of misreporting
In the next step, we employ individual ﬁxed effects OLS panel regressions to gain further in-
sights into the presence of social desirability bias and learning effects. The results of the panel
estimation for the two subjects are displayed in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. Although we present
only the estimated coefﬁcients that are relevant for these two sources of errors, the estimates
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Table 6. Panel regression results—social desirability†
Results for wages Results for pensions Results for unemployment
beneﬁts
Social desirability
Relative income (reference: 5th decile)
1st decile 7387.25 (1020.64)‡ 3536.36 (764.73)‡ 192.52 (1048.41)
2nd decile 5765.24 (776.71)‡ 1775.13 (684.73)§ 516.38 (441.90)
3rd decile 3524.27 (698.17)‡ 1098.89 (471.01)‡ −33:88 .834:57/
4th decile 1631.32 (362.68)‡ −136:74 .372:11/ 182.32 (471.82)
6th decile −1449:64 .509:38/‡ −349:92 .330:50/ −625:39 .661:51/
7th decile −2972:27 .653:50/‡ −1389:06 .982:90/ −799:96 .937:23/
8th decile −4425:72 .841:99/‡ −2143:49 .1184:84/ −1387:76 .701:87/§
9th decile −8118:60 .1319:65/‡ −3420:77 .773:14/‡ −1554:50 .705:41/§
10th decile −11598:02 .1696:99/‡ −6968:90 .1769:55/‡ −2839:05 .831:64/‡
Other controls
Individual ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Survey setting Yes Yes Yes
Learning effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 20372 10105 2470
R2 (full model) 0.70 0.72 0.81
Adjusted R2 (full model) 0.32 0.41 0.30
†The table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions with positive and negative reporting errors as de-
pendent variable (i.e. negative values correspond to underreporting and positive values to overreporting). Cluster
robust standard errors are given in parentheses. As identiﬁcation in ﬁxed effect models relies on sufﬁciently large
within variation, the variables gender, education and country of birth have been removed from the baseline speciﬁ-
cation. See the full list of estimated coefﬁcients in the on-line Table B.2. Source, SILC 2008–2011; own calculations.
‡p-value less than 0.01.
§p-value less than 0.05.
were done using the full set of controls, corresponding to Table 5. The remainder of the estimates
is contained in Tables B.2 and B.3 in the on-line appendix.
4.2.1. Social desirability
The dependent variable in the panel regression focusing on the evaluation of social desirability
is the negative or positive absolute difference between the survey report and the administrative
record.Weﬁnd that the difference between questionnaire and registerwages increaseswith rising
distance from themiddle of the distribution. This effect ismore pronounced at higher percentiles
compared with lower quantiles. For instance, in the lowest decile the average overreporting is
C7400 above the error in the ﬁfth decile, whereas the difference amounts to C11600 in the
top decile. A similar pattern is present for differences in pensions, although only statistically
signiﬁcant at both ends of the distribution. In the case of unemployment beneﬁts, point estimates
roughly indicate a mean reverting pattern in the longitudinal perspective. Only some quantiles
show statistically signiﬁcant differences from the average error in the ﬁfth decile and indicate
underreporting at the top.
4.2.2. Learning effect
Table 7 presents additional evidence on the presence of learning effects. Note that we deﬁne the
learning effect as adecline in theabsolute reporting errorsovermultiple surveywaves. In this case,
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Table 7. Panel regression results—learning effect†
Results for wages Results for pensions Results for unemployment
beneﬁts
Learning effect
Wave of interview (reference: 1st)
2nd −164:75 .631:32/ −1622:45 .264:10/‡ 191:71 .300:39/
3rd −353:89 .770:74/ −2546:06 .520:99/‡ 231:58 .433:76/
4th −478:33 .959:25/ −3397:04 .821:01/‡ 144:55 .568:08/
Other controls
Individual ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Social desirability Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Survey setting Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 20372 10105 2470
R2 (full model) 0.74 0.71 0.82
Adjusted R2 (full model) 0.40 0.39 0.31
†The table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions with absolute values of the reporting errors as
dependent variable (i.e. negative values (underreporting) have been multiplied by −1). Cluster robust standard
errors are given in parentheses. As identiﬁcation in ﬁxed effect models relies on sufﬁciently large within variation,
the variables gender, education and country of birth have been removed from the baseline speciﬁcation. See the
full list of estimated coefﬁcients in the on-line Table B.3. Source, SILC 2008–2011; own calculations.
‡p-value less than 0.01.
we do not distinguish between overreporting and underreporting and thus negative values of
the dependent variable are multiplied by −1. We ﬁnd mixed evidence for learning effects, which
crucially depend on the type of income under consideration. For wages and unemployment
beneﬁts, there is no statistically signiﬁcant reduction in reporting errors with increasing panel
duration, whereas such a pattern clearly emerges for pension incomes. For wages, our results
are in line with previous literature ﬁnding a positive, although not statistically signiﬁcant, serial
correlation of misreporting.
4.2.3. Robustness checks
We applied two robustness checks for our baseline panel speciﬁcation:
(a) estimates based on the four-wave balanced sample by using longitudinal weights (see
Tables B.4 and B.5 in the on-line appendix);
(b) speciﬁcations with the difference in log-income between register and survey data as de-
pendent variable (see Tables B.6 and B.7).
The panel regressions for the balanced sample broadly conﬁrm the social desirability effects
although with slightly smaller point estimates. Surprisingly, the already small learning effect for
pension income disappears completely in the balanced four-wave panel. In the second check, we
testwhetherour conclusions remainvalidwhen studying the relativedeviationsof surveyanswers
from administrative records. Overall, the models with the difference of the natural logarithms
of incomes have a higher model ﬁt. Mean reverting errors that were found in the baseline model
are observed again and have a similar pattern of statistical signiﬁcance. Again, learning effects
are only present for pensions where the model predicts a reduction in the difference between
survey and register data of approximately 19% in the last panel wave.
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Table 8. Decomposition of explained variance—SILC 2008–2011†
Wages Pensions Unemployment
(%) (%) beneﬁts (%)
Proportion of variance explained 15.8 11.4 46.4
Relative importance
(a) Social desirability 65.1 58.8 23.7
(b) Sociodemographic characteristics 34.0 24.5 64.5
(c) Survey setting 0.8 14.5 9.2
(d) Learning effect 0.0 2.2 2.6
†The table shows the goodness of ﬁt of OLS regressions and its decomposition
to four sources of error, i.e. four groups of explanatory variables. We quantify the
relative importance of (a) social desirability, (b) sociodemographic characteristics,
(c) aspects of the survey design and (d) learning effects on the basis of separate
regressions for wages, pensions and unemployment beneﬁts. Reporting errors are
regressed on the same set of explanatory variables as were used before (see Section 3),
using all available pooled cross-sections. Error and income variables are transformed
via the inverse hyperbolic sine function, which facilitates a log–log-interpretation in
the context of a signiﬁcant mass of 0s and negative values among the errors. Source:
SILC 2008–2011; own calculations.
4.3. Relative importance of sources of error
Finally, we apply an Owen value decomposition to assess the relative importance of the four
sources of error under consideration. The decomposition aims to assign a proportion of the
explained variance to groups of the explanatory variables. We consider two connected settings.
First, reporting errors and income variables enter the regressions transformed via the inverse
hyperbolic sine function. This transformation is closely related to the well-known logarithmic
transformation; however, it is also deﬁned for negative and 0-values. In the context of a signiﬁ-
cant mass of 0s and negative values among the reporting errors, this is a desirable property as
it allows us to consider the same number of observations as in the preceding calculations. The
results of this exercise are given in Table 8.
The ﬁrst row of Table 8 contains the adjusted R2 for each cross-sectional model. The total
variance explained is clearly highest for reporting mismatch in unemployment beneﬁts, where
46% can be traced back to the model variables. In contrast, for wage and pension differences
the corresponding ﬁgures amount to 16% and 11% respectively. Noteworthy, especially for
unemployment beneﬁts, but also in the case of wages and pensions, the magnitude of explained
variance in our regression is comparatively high (Kim and Tamborini, 2012). The remaining
rows show the group sums ofOwen values as percentages of the overallR2.Whereas the patterns
for wages and pensions are quite similar, unemployment beneﬁts show quite a different picture.
For wages and pensions, around 30% of the explained variance can be attributed to the group
of sociodemographic variables, whereas social desirability turns out to be of the highest relative
importance (around 60%). For wage differences, the survey setting and variables measuring the
panel participation (and thus learning effects) virtually do not contribute to the total R2 at
all. Learning effects also play a minor role for pensions whereas the survey setting contributes
roughly 15%.
The outcomes are considerably different for unemployment beneﬁts. With a share of 65%,
the group of sociodemographic variables is most relevant for overall R2. Compared with the
models for wages and pensions, social desirability is substantially less important whereas the
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sociodemographic characteristics gain relevance. Thus, misreporting of unemployment beneﬁts
does not so much depend on the level of unemployment beneﬁts but rather on sociodemo-
graphic characteristics of the recipients and is also more sensitive to the interview context and
mode.
Additionally, we repeat the same procedure without transforming the input variables (see
Table B.8 in the on-line appendix). Whereas the results on old age and unemployment beneﬁts
are almost identical, the R2 of the wage regression drops by two-thirds. However, our estimates
on the relative importance of the four sources of error are hardly affected, which strengthens
our conﬁdence in the robustness of our ﬁndings.
5. Conclusions
Income is very likely to be one of the most pervasive pieces of information in micro data sets,
since it plays an essential role for a wide range of welfare indicators and policy questions. The
traditional way of collecting income information is household surveys; however, the accuracy
of survey data has increasingly been contested during recent years. A main factor behind this
critique is the suspectedpresenceofmeasurement error in surveys, resulting from (un)intentional
misreporting. The identiﬁcation of data errors requires by deﬁnition some point of reference.
We follow the traditional literature and check survey data against administrative records by
using a unique data set: the Austrian 2008–2011 waves of the EU SILC survey. We make use of
the fact that, because of a legal initiative, the Austrian SILC provides both survey and register
income data for the same observational units for four consecutive years.
Whereas the vast majority of existing research assesses measurement error in income data for
US households, there is virtually no research using European panel data for various types of
income. The EU SILC data are a key data set for social policy issues since they provide the main
indicators for evaluating the Europe 2020 strategy. Given its importance as reference source
for comparative statistics on income distribution and social inclusion, data quality is a crucial
matter. Compared with previous literature, using the Austrian EU SILC data set for assessing
income measurement error has two main advantages. First, we do not have to fall back on two-
sample matching processes since agreement from respondents concerning data linkage was not
legally required. This advantage helps to avoid selection bias and, given that the Austrian EU
SILC is representative of the national population residing in private households, ensures high
external validity. Second, we can evaluate income measurement error for various components
of total disposable household income in the very same data set.
We elaborate fourmajor reasons formisreportingdiscussed in the literature: social desirability,
sociodemographic characteristics of the respondent, speciﬁcs of the survey design and the pres-
ence of learning effects for three types of personal income (wages, pensions and unemployment
beneﬁts).
The main ﬁndings are as follows. For personal income and in line with the existing literature,
statistically signiﬁcant mean reverting errors are revealed in both cross-sectional and panel
regression models. We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly higher probabilities of overreporting at the bottom of
the wage distribution and, vice versa, higher likelihoods of underreporting at the top tail. By
including a broad range of control variables to capture the complexity of the annual income
stream, we interpret this result as evidence of social desirability in reporting wages. Although
the effects are generally less pronounced and sometimes even statistically insigniﬁcant, similar
patterns occur for pension income and unemployment beneﬁts.
Concerning sociodemographic characteristics, males are found to have a signiﬁcantly higher
tendency to overreport wages, pensions and unemployment beneﬁts. Additionally, there is a
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signiﬁcant relationship between health and misreporting; for instance, good health conditions
correlate with more correct survey responses particularly for pensions. The higher chances of
underreporting for respondents being born outside the EU 15 countries hint at the presence
of language and comprehension problems, despite the fact that interviews were also conducted
in other languages if requested by respondents. We ﬁnd consistent evidence that a complex
income and employment context withmany changes during the income reference period hinders
recall and thus increases misreporting. Multiple changes in employment status have a strong
effect on reporting errors in pensions; a shorter status duration increases errors particularly for
unemployment beneﬁts and wages.
For survey designers, the Owen value decomposition might be of particular interest since it
reveals that social desirability is amajor explanation formisreportingwages andpension income.
For unemployment beneﬁts, sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents seem to play
the major role for reporting errors. The survey setting is relatively less important for explaining
misreporting, whereas learning effects are hardly noticeable. Our ﬁndings from the Owen value
decomposition suggest that data producers should be even more aware of social desirability
when constructing interview questionnaires. The order and wording of questions on income
could incite or inhibit erroneous income reports. It is crucial that survey responses should be
validated by actual income proofs, such as payslips. If wages of employees are available on line
in web portals of the ﬁnancial authorities (like in Austria), data producers could possibly lobby
for cross-checking with these sources. Moreover, proxy interviews show signiﬁcantly higher
probabilities of misreporting than do personal interviews. Similarly, the larger the time span
between the income reference period and the interview, themore likely ismisreporting. Evidence
on the presence of a learning effect is mixed and depends crucially on the type of income under
consideration.
Survey users may be interested in the various types of bias that result frommeasurement error
in linear models. In Table B.10 of the on-line supplementary materials, we present estimates
of three types of bias: bias in OLS estimators due to measurement error in the explanatory
variables, bias in instrumental variable estimators due to measurement error in the explanatory
variables, and bias due to measurement error in the dependent variable. Quantifying the bias
that is associated with misreporting gives data users and practitioners some guidance on what
to expect when they use (or read publications using) income data from SILC in regression
models. For instance, we ﬁnd that all results estimating returns (e.g. of education) on wages are
underestimated by about 25%. However, we advise against interpreting these results as general
attenuation bias of survey income data. The reasons for and structure of misreporting might
vary considerably across countries.
For policy makers, our results point to the fact that for some sociodemographic groups—
including those most relevant for policy makers—survey income data may potentially be an
inﬁrm ground for decision making. Thus, investments in the development, maintenance, ad-
vancement and accessibility of public administrative data, as an alternative, may pay off for
better targeted policies. Having both survey and register data at hand for the same units opens
up several perspectives for further research. For instance, a next step could be to look at the
joint distribution of errors for respondents who have more than one of the three income com-
ponents at once in a given year and check whether those who underreport one source are also
more likely to underreport another. It could also be worthwhile to replicate our analysis on
the basis of gross income values. Another fruitful avenue for further inquiries could be to train
a statistical model that allows survey producers to correct the income information based on
other unobservable characteristics of the respondents. Moreover, income is a key explanatory
variable in social science research. As in Hariri and Lassen (2017), one could therefore check
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how conclusions for prominent regressions where income is used as a right-hand-side variable
(health, wellbeing, etc.) are altered when survey data are replaced by register data.
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